The decision to replace, like-for-like, the United Kingdom's fleet of nuclear- The SNP pledged to evict nuclear submarines from their bases in the Clyde when Scotland attained the legal rights and powers of a sovereign state.
Since there appeared to be no plausible alternative bases in England and Wales, a 'yes' vote in the referendum might have ended the UK's long engagement with nuclear weapons.
In the event, Scotland's voters rejected independence by a significant margin, 55%-45%. The UK Ministry of Defence concluded that the nuclear bases' future had been secured. Then the unexpected happened again. The SNP experienced a surge in support after the referendum, creating expectations that the UK general election in May 2015 would result in a government reliant on cooperation between the Labour Party and the SNP, again jeopardising 'Trident' (as the nuclear-weapons programme is colloquially known in British politics, and as it will be referred to here).
Trident's Replacement and the Survival of the United Kingdom
Instead, the Conservative Party gained a decisive victory, giving it enough votes to drive Trident's replacement through the House of Commons against any opposition, including that coming from the SNP's extraordinarily large bloc of 56 (out of Scotland's 59) seats in the new parliament. It is tempting for the Conservative government to assume that the decision due in 2016 on moving the project from preparation into full manufacture is now unproblematic.
That assumption would be premature. Despite the referendum's defeat and the Conservative Party's ascendancy, profound changes have occurred, and are still occurring, in the political entity that still calls itself the United Kingdom. Where does political -rather than strictly legal -authority over decision now reside in this state, and how may it be exercised effectively, legitimately and without deleterious effect? Can the Union survive without fundamental reform? These are the deep questions upon which the fate of Trident, among other vital matters, will ultimately rest.
The SNP would also be mistaken to believe that it could frustrate Trident's replacement without political risk. It cannot pretend that conflict with a nuclear-armed Russia and broader shifts in international power structures are not happening and have no consequences for the party's stances on Trident and NATO membership, or for its international reputation. Nor can the UK pretend that Trident's replacement is only simplified by threats from the East and elsewhere, since they dramatise choices between spending on nuclear and conventional forces, and between meeting defence and other priorities, at a time of financial austerity. All actors in this drama face predicaments.
The nub of the matter is this: if, as seems likely, consents are given and contracts issued in 2016 for the Trident weapon system's manufacture, the UK government will find itself driven to protect the decision's irreversibility over the medium and long terms. It will be making commitments to live with Trident's opportunity costs and, absent a revolution in Scottish attitudes, coerce political Scotland into accepting that the UK's new nuclear submarines will be based there for their lifetime, come what may. If the government is not prepared to make those commitments, the latter affecting the United Kingdom's chances of survival, it will have to revisit the alternatives, and soon. Even without the recent increase in defence spending, it was always unlikely that a Conservative government would allow the Trident replacement programme to be derailed for economic reasons or to make way for investments in conventional defence, however badly they might be needed.
Squeaky gates
Desiring to preserve 'continuous-at-sea-deterrence' (CASD), it has also dismissed proposals to reduce the number of nuclear-armed submarines from four to three. 
The Scottish question
The UK government will still have to find a way past unremitting Scottish opposition to its plans. The UK's nuclear force relies on two bases in Party may also gain seats).
14 It is also possible that the Scottish Labour Party, never enthusiastic about Trident, will vote against replacement in its effort to recover popularity after being crushed in the 2015 UK general election.
As before, the UK government could assert the legality of a decision to 17 There has also been talk of a referendum depending on 'the will of the people' rather than the choice of politicians. 18 In practice, this means that Scotland's political leaders will take their cue from opinion polls. They will only call another referendum when polls indicate that a majority of voters favours independence. For Cameron, persuading the 27 other EU member states to play ball, avoiding serious splits within the Conservative Party, placating the City of London and business interests and ultimately winning the referendum will be enormously challenging. These tasks will be much more preoccupying and dangerous to his reputation than Trident's replacement. 
Back to the alternatives
The UK government has four options for circumventing or overcoming Scotland's opposition to its Trident replacement policy, none of which it probably considers palatable.
Firstly, it could abandon plans to maintain the British nuclear deterrent. This is least likely to happen, so great (outside Scotland) is the prestige value ascribed to nuclear weapons and the stigma attached to unilateral disarmament, and amidst worries about negative trends in international security.
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There is unlikely to be any departure from the UK government's traditional assertion that the UK's nuclear disarmament is contingent on global nuclear disarmament achieved through multilateral processes.
Secondly, the UK could adopt a nuclear-weapons system that did not rely on large naval bases and associated infrastructures. The alternatives have been studied on several occasions, always with the same conclusion:
they would be militarily inferior, cost savings would be insufficient to justify the shift and they would present fresh technological challenges. The option of air-launched missiles would also return operational responsibility for the deterrent to the Royal Air Force, where it would not be welcome, and raise fresh basing issues. This might happen, but no one should assume that it would. Reneging on the long-standing commitment to remove nuclear weapons from Scotland would be regarded as an act of betrayal by many supporters of independence unless some international crisis had brought a dramatic change of attitude towards deterrence in the meantime. The possibility that Scotland will become a sovereign state should therefore inform the decision on Main
Gate, rather than being dismissed.
World views
An ironic distinction between the nuclear situations arising from the Soviet Union's actual and the UK's potential break-up deserves notice. In the early 1990s, the great objective -including the UK and US governments' objective -was to remove, as rapidly as possible, strategic nuclear weapons from
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine prior to their attaining statehood and to ensure that they renounced rights to acquire nuclear forces by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapons states.
The Russian Federation was alone entitled to retain its nuclear deterrent and the legal standing of a nuclear-weapons state under the treaty. In contrast, every signal coming from London, Paris and Washington during the 2014 referendum suggested that, in the event of the UK's break-up, the great objective would be to avoid the removal of nuclear weapons from Scotland, and certainly to avoid their rapid removal, thereby enabling the rest of the UK to stay in the nuclear game whilst ensuring that Scotland also joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state.
The situations are different in two particular respects: Scotland is not regarded as a proliferation risk, having no imaginable desire to arm itself with nuclear weapons; and the Russian Federation, unlike the rest of the UK, could dispense with the weapons located in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine having plenty -including the entire submarine fleet at Severomorsk -based on its own sovereign territory. England lacks this capacity. Following
Scotland's independence, the rest of the UK would find itself, uniquely among nuclear-armed states, striving to base its entire nuclear force on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapons state, and one that opposed its presence there.
The UK's allies may favour Trident's like-for-like replacement. However, it would be difficult for them to give it strong, overt support if a contest developed between Scotland and the rest of the UK over basing rights. They might deny Scotland entry to NATO if it persisted with its anti-nuclear policy. However, coercing a non-nuclear-weapons state into providing bases for another state's nuclear force -in effect pursuing a counter-disarmament policy -would not sit easily with the norms and rules of the international nuclear order, especially when nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are being so strongly advocated. In addition, the Scottish referendum has already exposed the problems that the US and other democratic governments face when trying to reconcile the democratic rights of the Scottish nation with their interests in the UK's survival. Those problems would become more acute if Scotland attained independence and sought to exercise its sovereign, democratic right to remove nuclear weapons from its territory.
* * *
Ultimately, whether the UK should replace Trident is a question of marginal importance in world politics. Even within Europe, its nuclear force's contribution to the balance of power and avoidance of war is questionable.
Whether the UK hangs together as a state has much greater international significance.
The United Kingdom's fate will be determined by much more than next year's decision on Trident. But the nuclear force's basing in the Clyde has long been a toxic issue in Scotland, breathing life into the idea of independence. A decision to press forward with the current replacement project, overriding Scottish opinion, would do further damage to the Union. Since the primary interest of foreign governments, including the US government, resides in the Union's preservation, they should be advising the Conservative government to reconsider the current replacement policy, and to hold back from using its parliamentary majority to ram it through the House of Commons.
The UK's allies' best outcome would probably combine the survival of the Union and of the nuclear deterrent, pointing towards development of an alternative to the submarine force or to its basing in Scotland (perhaps moving it to King's Bay in Georgia), despite the hour being late. A fleet of four nuclear-armed submarines has long been regarded as the minimum necessary for practising CASD, whereby one nuclear-armed submarine is on patrol at any one time. Reduction to three might limit the UK's ability to respond in a sudden crisis. Concerns have also been expressed that hastily sending a submarine to sea when none is deployed might escalate a crisis.
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The previous Parliament of Scotland closed in 1707, after a more than 400-year history, when the Act 
